บทความเผยแพร่ฟรีและแลกเปลี่ยนความคิดเห็น-Academic Paper for Critique

Nāgārjuna, the great Buddhist philosopher, who was known as the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Māhayāna Buddhism, is its first systematizer. T.R.V.Murti said "The Mādhyamika system seems to have been perfected at one stroke by the genius of its founder Nāgārjuna." (Narain 1997:3). Yet there can be no denying the fact that all his basic ideas are found scattered in the Prajñāpāramitā texts, which happen to be a mine of all Mahāyāna doctrines, especially the Mādhyamika.

In the school of Nāgārjuna, it received a dialectical foundation. Nāgārjuna was said to be Buddhist logician beyond logic, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems. The Mādhyamika school is very famous for its dialectics. As already pointed out, Buddha is said to be the originator of this system by saying "That everything exists is one extreme; that it does not exist is another. (Sharma 1994:12). Nāgārjuna is descended this doctrine from the Buddha. Epistemologically, Mādhyamika school was a change from empiricism and dogmatism to dialectical criticism. In metaphysics, it argued for the rejection of metaphysical speculation. According to he Mādhyamika, any speculation about the true nature of things is erroneous and should be rejected.

The Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā is the first regular work on the Mādhyamika school. The doctrine, which permeates this work, is that of the middle path which is to be comprehended from four aspects, viz. (1) in contradistinction to one-sidedness (2) as the abnegation of one-sidedness, (3) as unity in plurality, and (4) in the sense of absolute truth.

By "the middle path" it is not to be understood that there is something between the two extremes of being and non-being. In fact, we must avoid not only the two extremes, but also the middle. As we cannot conceive of being (existence) independently of non-being (non-existence), it will be taking a one-sided view if we are to say that the world exists or that it does not exist. The middle path furnishes a contrast to this one-sidedness by avoiding the two extremes of being and non-being.

"No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause"

(Mūlamadhyamakakā p.105)

Denying the two extremes the middle path reveals reality through a complete harmony between them, that is, it transcends the extremes of being and non-being which are unified. Otherwise, the middle path, which unified all particulars, does not lie beyond them. The particulars attain their characters of particularity only though our conception of the unity among them. Had there been no unifying principle, the particulars would have ceased to be such. Nāgārjuna expressed in the chapter of Skandha-pariksā (Examination of Aggregates) in his work " Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā:-

"When material form is (considered to be) distinct from the cause of material form, it follows that material form is without a cause. Nowhere is there any effect without a cause."

(Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā p.1)

In the chapter of Duhkha-parīksā (Examination of Suffering):-

"If (suffering were to be) self-caused,

then it could not occur dependently. Indeed, depending upon these aggregates, these other aggregates occur.”

(Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā p.211)

Nāgārjuna did not deny the reality of material form but only the method of explaining it. Indeed, the ultimate truth of nāmarūpa has not been realized by common logic or the descriptive language. The ultimate truth is beyond the reach of verbal designation (prapañca) or thought-construct (vikalypa). The ineffability (anabhilā) of the Truth is descriptions frequently encountered in the Mahāyāna texts (Nagao 1991:40) or the Sanskrit Buddhist literatures. The word is, as it were, merely a finger pointing at the moon. Just as a person would not see the moon by concentrating on the finger, he would miss Truth completely if he is engrossed in the word.

An activity becomes possible only when the world is śunyatā (emptiness). It is inconceivable that an activity takes place in a substantive being, for a substantive being is understood to be an eternal, immutable being, and, therefore, could not be active and undergo change. Only when there is no substantiality, that is, when sūnyatā is, can there be change and activity. This point is discussed thoroughly in the chapter of Āryasatya parīksā (Examination of the Noble Truths) of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā:-

"If everything is not śūnya.

There can never by any appearance.

Disappearance or transformation.

Hence there can be no Buddha-dharma.

Such as the Four Noble Truths

(Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā p. 342)

An in the chapter of Tathāgata-parīksā (Examination of the tathāgata), Nāgārjuna rejected any opinion or speculation or dogma regarding either the "empty" or "non-empty" or both or neither. Neither the empty nor the non-empty should be reified. These terms are used only for the sake of communicating or expressing and experience which, being dependent (pratityasamutpanna), has no static self-nature (svabhāva), and as such cannot be demarcates and reified. The subtle difference between vaktavya ("should be declared") and kathyate ("is spoken of, is expressed") should not go unnoticed. For Nāgārjuna, declaration and expression are two different activities, the former calling for unquestioned acceptance, a sort of categorical imperative, the latter leaving room for modification depending upon the context. As we see in this verse:-

"Empty", "non-empty", "both" or

"neither"-these should not be declared.

It is expressed only for the purpose of communication"

(Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā p. 307)

Kant became famous primarily because of his critique of metaphysics, but from Nāgārjuna's standpoint, Kant's philosophy would be considered metaphysical. Kant's idea of the noumenon is a metaphysical concept; he gave "the term noumena to things in themselves". (Kant 1965: 273).

Although he denied the possibility of our knowledge of things in themselves, he acknowledged that we can think of them "under the little of an unknown something". This unknown something was said to be "a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretentions of sensibility". (Kant 1965: 272).

However, it was regarded as something indispensable, for "The doctrine of sensibility is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense". (Kant 1965: 268). Our sensation, Kant contended, must have a cause, and the cause cannot be the subject, but must be the object, the thing-in-itself. Thus, although things-in themselves are unknowable as they are in themselves, Kant held that we know them through the representations which their influences on our sensibility procure for us". (Kant 1889: 13).

Kant criticized metaphysical theories such as rational psychology, speculative cosmology and natural theology. (Kant 1965: 324), but he did not reject all metaphysical issues as meaningless problems. Our knowledge of things, according to Kant, should be restricted to empirical or phenomenal reality. Human categories or concepts can give men knowledge "only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle experience". (Kant 1965: 162). So, we can say Kant’s critical philosophy aimed to limit our intellectual activities to the sphere of experience.

The final outcome of this whole section is therefore this: all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than principles a priori of the possibility of experience, and to experience alone do a priori synthetic propositions relate-indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation. (Kant 1965: 256). For Kant, perception or empirical intuition is the chief source and means of empirical knowledge. Directly or indirectly, all thinking must ultimately…..refer to perception, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. (Kant 1965: 65)

Kant answered that knowledge means certain knowledge. Such knowledge according to him is found in mathematics and physics. (Masih 1994: 331). Both of these sciences were making good progress. So skepticism appeared to him to be unwarranted. If, therefore, empiricism and rationalism had failed to explain knowledge, them their failure would not be reflecting any actual state of affairs in the world of science. Their failure would be entirely the consequence of their improper analysis of knowledge.

The failure of empiricism-Kant holds that the manifold of sense-data or the sense-impressions are passing events. However, knowledge proper is obtained by ordering, connecting and synthesizing them in to some system. Ordinarily, we systematize the discrete sensory data with the help of the categories of substance, causality etc. If substance and causality were mere fictions and then certainly there could be no intelligible way in which the discrete and passing manifold of sense-impressions could be ordered. Without the order, there could be no knowledge. Therefore, skepticism is a necessary outcome of classical empiricism.

On the basis of experience, strict universality and necessity cannot be obtained. So empiricism can never guarantee universal and necessary elements in empirical propositions. Knowledge proper must have universal and necessary factors along with factuality. So, on the very face of it, empiricism cannot explain knowledge as is found in mathematics and physics.

The failure of rationalism-According to rationalism there is a universal faculty of reason by virtue of which each individual has certain innate ideas. Knowledge proper, according to it, is exclusively constituted of such ideas. This theory successfully explains universality and necessity. All men have the same innate ideas because of their possessing a common faculty of reason. Naturally, being constituted of them cognitive propositions must be the same for all men. All persons cannot but perceive the truth as their rational faculty directs them. Hence, cognitive propositions constituted by innate ideas must be necessary as a result of inner compulsion or constraint.

But the difficulty of rationalism lies in another direction. Innate ideas are subjective, being in the mind of human knower. What is the guarantee that they will also be true of facts? Kant rejected rationalism on the ground that it dealt with airy structures without correspondence with facts. (Mashi 1994: 333).

Kant's philosophy is known as reconciliation between empiricism and rationalism. According to Kant, metaphysics as a science is not possible. The attempt at extending knowledge with the help of a priori elements alone, without reference to empirical objects, lands us, according to him, into hopeless illusions. However, though we realize the illusory nature of metaphysical objects, yet we can never completely shake them off. Hence metaphysics, according to Kant is not a science but is supported by a natural disposition in man.

Kant makes a sharp distinction between sensing and understanding. In sensing and object, the mind remains passive. But this is not enough for the explanation of the knowing process. The manifold of sense is discrete and passing impressions. Obviously a proposition is a combination of two or more ideas. The knowledge consists of judgments which are the combinations of two ideas. Hence, the knowing process consists in combining the ideas. Here the two terms "thinking" and "knowing" have to be distinguished. By "knowing" is meant the thinking process validly applied to percepts.

In Kant's view of transcendental dialectic. There is scientific knowledge according to Kant, but then it is of the phenomena alone. We have no means of knowing the supersensible or noumena. We have all the certainty and objectivity of knowledge so far as phenomena are given. But this demands that the concepts be applied to the sensible. Beyond the sensible we can think but then we cannot know. Knowledge is, then, highly limited but the human mind cannot rest content with the limited sphere of phenomena. It craves for absolute spontaneity, necessity, originally and finality. That faculty which leads the human intellect to the understanding, and ends with reason.

According to Buddhism, we have seen, the Thing-in-Itself is cognized in pure sensation. The things cognized clearly and distinctly are objectified images. Kant, in his critical period, in all other systems clear and distinct thinking has been assumed as a guaranty of truth. Through the senses phenomena alone are confusedly cognized, through the understanding or the reason, ultimately reality, things, as they really are in themselves are clearly cognized. Kant has reversed this relation. Clear and distinct cognition refers only to phenomena, but that which in the phenomena corresponds to sensation, constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects, as Things by themselves. (Stcherbatsky 1994: 200). So, in Kant's view, the Thing-in-Itself is incognizable. We cannot represent it in a sensuous image; it is the limit of cognition. Like Nāgārjuna's thought, The ultimate particular cannot be reached by our cognition.

Nāgārjuna's rejection of the concept of noumena does not imply that he accepted the legitimate use of human categories or concepts in realm of phenomena. From the Mādhyamika standpoint, empirical reality or the phenomenally real are unintelligible ideas. What is empirical or phenomenal is supposed to be causally dependent and hence is devoid of its own nature, but what is real must have its own nature or its essence. The term empirical reality, as we have seen, would mean that which lacks its own nature has its own nature, and to call something phenomenally real is tantamount to claiming that a thing without essential nature has essential nature. These are contradiction in term.

In the chapter of Pratyaya-parīksā (Examination of Conditions), the verses are expressed:-

"The effect does not exist in the conditions that are separated or combined. Therefore, how can that which is not found in the conditions come to be from the conditions?"

(Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā p.115)

Like Kant, Nāgārjuna took his standpoint, on the moral act, the immanent freedom that is felt by man in his endeavors to better his condition. Even man's suffering is evidence of his inherent freedom; a stone -pillar does not suffer. This felt immanent freedom can be made absolute by right effort conduct as well as by insight into the moral law. Kant speaks of the two appalling infinites-"The starry heavens above and the Moral Law within man" (Murti 1996: 200) The starry heaven is not to be understood as the mere immensity of physical Nature, but the mysterium tremendum of the Author of the Universe. The two infinities symbolize the two basic patterns of religious consciousness one being God-centered and the other man-centered.

Buddhism differs from Kant's thought in the aspect of God-centered. Buddhism rejects the concept of God-centered. The fundamental principle in Buddhism is the autonomy of the Moral Law (Karma) - the freedom that we feel and exercise in our actions and which determines what we are and what we would be. Salvation or Absolute freedom is freedom from moral evil, from passions and their defilement. Spiritual discipline is the path of purification. This is achieved through human effort and human regeneration. There is no place for outside help or divine guidance. Salvation is strictly a sustained and heroic act on the part of man. It is not an act of God or cooperation between man and God.

Similarly between Nāgārjuna and Kant, Kant's a priori form of perception would be considered nonsensical. In the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna, we are still examining whether there is the act of perceiving, and cannot use that which is being perceived to establish the act. Thus, since neither a perceiver nor an act of perceiving can be established, it makes no sense to hold that perception is the source and means of a posteriori judgments, or that objects of knowledge must be perceivable.

For Kant, truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgment, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understanding. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of understanding there is no error. (Kant 1965: 287).

Many contemporary Mādhyamika scholars have similar tendencies. Ever the term empty or emptiness is thought to refer to some thing, whether absolute reality or nothingness or suchness. If there is a thing that is not empty, then there must be something that is empty. Since nothing is empty, how can there be an empty thing. (Cheng 1991: 112).

In conclusion, unlike Kant, Nāgārjuna was optimistic about elimination of metaphysical speculation. "Emptiness" does not "stand for" or "refer to" anything, but is a stereological device to cure the disease by showing that all things are empty. Linguistically, to see everything as empty is to abandon the assumption of a one-to-one correlation between concepts or categories and extra-linguistic referents. This makes one realize that metaphysical questions of the world are absurd, and hence frees one from metaphysical speculation.

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